Big Sticks and Small Carrots

When the Prince of Darkness starts talking about “serious consequences” for Iran, it provokes a troubling sense of deja vu. When Little Tony Blair joins in with a textbook evocation of the Nazis, that feeling is only reinforced.

There are differences between Iran and Iraq however. We should not lose sight of the fact that the Iranians actually could develop geopolitically significant weapons of mass destruction in a matter of years if they so desire. The IAEA does have real concerns regarding the purposes of Iran’s nuclear programme and Larijani’s resignation and his replacement with an Ahmadniejad ally suggests that Iran’s Supreme Leader is inclined to favour the President’s hardline approach. The Iranians insist that their programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes and it may well be but questions undoubtedly remain.

In truth, it is perfectly possible that the Iranians want nuclear weapons or, more likely perhaps, the capacity to build nuclear weapons if the regime is threatened. Given what has happened to Iraq and given also the constant belligerent “axis of evil” rhetoric, it would hardly be surprising if the Iranian regime was seeking to acquire a means of defending itself. Indeed, it can be argued that this would be the most rational strategy it could adopt. There are not many government’s in the world who would not attempt to defend themselves and their countries from a perceived threat.

The Iranian nuclear programme pre-dates the invasion of Iraq of course but it isn’t a huge leap to suggest that it is that unprovoked attack on their neighbour along with an essentially explicit suggestion that they’d be next which has made them so unwilling to compromise on this issue.

If (and it is still if) they are attempting to acquire the means to build nuclear weapons, what could be done to stop them? The answer is not a lot, especially if you’re the government’s of the US and UK.

For a start, moral authority on this issue isn’t helped by the fact that these countries have no genuine intention of abiding by the disarmament pillar of the NPT. Indeed, the UK, by adopting the precautionary principle in renewing its Trident capability, has implicitly admitted that it has no intention of abiding by the disarmament pillar at any point in the foreseeable future. The UK government will still insist that the rest of the treaty is fully implemented by other countries but the bits they consider to be detrimental to the UK’s national interest will simply be ignored. Not the loftiest of positions then.

In practical terms, the options are extremely limited. A land invasion of Iran is a non-starter. Even if the chicken hawks could create the political climate which would allow it, there simply aren’t enough troops to do the job. The Iranian regime knows this and it may well be a further reason for their refusal to compromise. They’re holding the best hand and they know it.

With an invasion ruled out, the favoured strategy of the armchair generals appears to be some form of limited strategic bombing campaign targeting Iranian nuclear facilities. There are so many problems with this approach that it’s hard to know where to start. First of all, Iraq should have been a graphic and bloody illustration of the inexplicably overlooked fact that “the other side” also has a significant say in the scope, scale, tactics and outcome of any military action. The armchair generals still don’t seem to understand this most basic rule of warfare.

A “limited” campaign will be far from limited when the Iranians respond in the ways the US military is least able to deal with. Coalition forces in Iraq would be a prime target. The notion of a “limited” military effort is a dangerous fantasy, as facile as the infamous belief in “sweets and flowers”.

And what would be the result of this “limited” bombing campaign? It may be a setback for the Iranian nuclear programme if certainly facilities are destroyed but it certainly wouldn’t provide any guarantees or offer any sort of long term solution. It would, however, create a tremendous backlash of Iranian nationalism as well as renewed support for the regime. If the Iranian government is trying to acquire the ability to build nuclear weapons, they’re not going to stop because of this. In fact, it’d only increase their determination.

Attacks like these would also create a further wave of anti-Western sentiment among (some) Muslims and give further credibility to bin Laden’s “the West hates Islam” propaganda. The long term damage will almost certainly far outweigh any potential benefits. Unfortunately, this option still looks the one most likely to be implemented by the Bush administration.

If they manage to resist the bombing, that leave sanctions or covert attempts to foster regime change. Neither looks like having a high chance of success in the current climate. If the Iranians really want to develop a nuclear weapons capability, it’s hard to see what will stop them achieving it.

There are a lot of “ifs” in all of this. After Iraq, those who continue to strip away caveats and express a certainty they can’t possibly substantiate are probably lost causes. It is certainly possible, however, that one of the most significant consequences of the Iraq war could also be an irony of truly gargantuan proportions. A war built on the lie that there was an urgent need to disarm Saddam of non-existent WMDs along with the idiotic fantasy that it would stabilise the region could result in a nuclear capable Iran in an increasingly unstable Middle East.

In a way, the most worrying thing is that many of those who were influential in the original decision to invade Iraq are still in positions of power. It’s hard to imagine a group of people who are less qualified to deal with the Iranian situation.