Big Sticks and Small Carrots

As you’ll probably know, the latest US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear programme came to an astonishing conclusion. The antagonistic relationship between Tehran and Washington could escalate the situation at any time (as could “events” on the Iran/Iraq border) but this new report dramatically lessens the likelihood of a major military confrontation between the two countries before the end of the Bush presidency. It’s a really rather refreshing bit of good news.

Bush, of course, continues to insist that “all options are on the table”. John Bolton, who may well be the commander-in-chief of all armchair generals everywhere, has taken to the airwaves to cast doubt on the conclusions of the NIE. He even went as far as to suggest (in the form of a question, of course) that the report was the result of politically motivated attack on the Bush administration:

I think there is a risk here, and I raise this as a question, whether people in the intelligence community who had their own agenda on Iran for some time now have politicized this intelligence and politicized these judgements in a way contrary to where the administration was going.

Because in Bolton’s world, if you don’t agree with him, you’re clearly a mendacious leftist and a terrorist loving traitor. I give it another 24 hours before he starts publicly agitating for a war against the US intelligence community.

In reality, the volte-face in the conclusion of the National Intelligence Estimate (pdf) appears to be based on an objective analysis of the available facts. It suggests that US intelligence agencies are attempting to rectify the failures which led to the invasion of Iraq.

The report was not the written based on the assumption that the Iranian regime does intend to acquire nuclear weapons. It was, rather, an attempt to “assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire nuclear weapons”.

More importantly perhaps, the conclusions of the report appear to be untainted by political pressures. Clearly, the NIE discredits claims made by many of Bush’s supporters and damages the “Iran is going to kill us all” narrative being pushed from the Whitehouse. The Bush administration will not have welcomed these conclusions but they’ve been published all the same. It is possible that lessons really have been learned from the Iraq debacle.

(Can we same the same in the UK, I wonder?)

The most interesting conclusion of the NIE is this:

Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program.

A cost-benefit approach? But that’d imply that the Iranian regime were behaving, gasp, perfectly rationally. Surely some mistake…