Big Sticks and Small Carrots

Apparently, the UK is a soft touch and multiculturalism is to blame. And, contrary to rumours, my hamster was not killed by curiosity but by multiculturalism. It’s evil, I tells you.

But this post isn’t about multiculturalism. Reading the RUSI article (pdf), it becomes apparent that a large part of it is concerned with something else.

The opening two sentences read:

The security of the United Kingdom is at risk and under threat. The mismatch between the country’s military commitments and the funding of its defence moved Lords Bramall, Boyce, Craig, Guthrie and Inge – five former Chiefs of the Defence Staff – to take the unusual step of raising their concerns publicly in a House of Lords Defence debate on 22 November 2007.

Quite a strong clue there as to what that something else is. As the article progresses, it becomes clear that the authors don’t just blame the current Labour government for the current situation:

Both political parties have been complicit, from the time of the Rifkind Defence Review under the Major administration to the agitated activity and many institutional disturbances of the Blair administrations. And now we have the failure of the Brown administration to provide the significant increases of core funding for defence that so exercises Lords Bramall, Boyce, Craig, Guthrie and Inge. Official assertions plead otherwise, but the intervention of the Chiefs of the Defence Staff suggests an atmosphere of chronic disrepair. Britain’s defence forces have been reduced during a decade of overuse, under-funding and general underprovision relative to that use.

How very non-partisan.

For the avoidance of doubt, the conclusion says this of the structural change recommended in the article:

It would reduce the appearance of short-term political advantage in the deployment of our defence forces and promote acceptance of necessary provision for defence and security. [My emphasis.]

It is, as is so often the case, about money. In essence, the theory is that a non-partisan body would be in a position to effectively sell the case for increases in military spending to a sceptical public. Such a body, would, the authors believe, command greater authority and respect than the government of the day. As such, you can see why they were so keen to make the parallel with the Monetary Policy Committee at the Bank of England. Public confidence in that body is high and its decisions and pronouncements are respected. Who wouldn’t want some of that?

In short, the committees suggested by the article would ultimately operate as lobbyists for arms manufacturers but with moral authority and public respect. To be fair, the authors have been reasonably quite open about this. If you look at the press release, these points are not hidden. Multiculturalism, on the other hand, doesn’t get a mention. (To be fair to the media, they don’t seem to have misquoted the article, just chosen to emphasise this one part of a wider argument).

There are undoubtedly many people who would agree with this approach or at least with the goal of increases in military spending. Unsurprisingly, I’m not one of them. Rather than go into the reasons in detail, I can explain with reference to one phrase. In the press release, co-author Professor Prins, is quoted as saying:

The United Kingdom can only take the risk of a bare-bones defence and security establishment if we are sure of the shape of the threat. Today we are not, and cannot be. Britain’s defence forces have been reduced during a decade of over-use, under-funding and general under-provision relative to that use. Defence and security must be restored as the first duty of government.

When an “expert on international security” used the phrase “bare-bones defence and security establishment” in relation to the UK, something has gone horribly wrong.

The UK spends more on its military than almost any country in the world. Depending on how you measure it, the UK is the 2nd or 5th largest spender. In the world. Of the top 15 spenders, only the USA and Saudia Arabia spend more per person on the military. (From the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.)

An “expert on international security” should certainly know this. No, an “expert on international security” certainly does know this.

A bare bones defence? Professor Prins undoubtedly also thinks that participants in Celebrity Fit Club could do to gain a few pounds.

Over the last few days, there has been much said about Dean Godson, Policy Exchange’s “Research Director”. His appearance on Newsnight to defend P.E.’s report into extremist literature was quite extraordinary. Here are some interesting facts about Mr Godson.

Most notably, he holds the extraordinary distinction of having lost his position at the Daily Telegraph because of his political views. Back in 2004, Martin Newland, former Telegraph editor, explained to the Guardian:

It’s OK to be pro-Israel, but not to be unbelievably pro-Likud Israel, it’s OK to be pro-American but not look as if you’re taking instructions from Washington. Dean Godson and Barbara Amiel were key departures.

Dean Godson was too pro-Likud and too subservient to the US government for the Telegraph. Given the writers they happily still employ, you’ve got to wonder just how extreme his own views must be.

Mr Godson has also been reasonably open about the need for the US and UK government’s to deploy covert propaganda techniques. In an article for the Times in 2006, he wrote that:

During the Cold War, organisations such as the Information Research Department of the Foreign Office would assert the superiority of the West over its totalitarian rivals. And magazines such as Encounter did hand-to-hand combat with Soviet fellow travellers. For any kind of truly moderate Islam to flourish, we need first to recapture our own self-confidence. At the moment, the extremists largely have the field to themselves.

The Information Research Department was a secret Foreign Office propaganda organisation which operated mostly in the developing world during the Cold War. It’s practices were modelled on psychological warfare operations. Typically, it covertly spoon fed “slanted” anti-communist stories to journalists to achieve the desired effect

Encounter magazine, on the other hand, was funded by the CIA. Based in London and initially edited by Irving Kristol, it too was a covert Cold War propaganda tool. It’s primary function seems to have been to attempt to steer European left wing intellectuals down the “right” path (no pun intended). The “right” path was the path deemed most acceptable by right wingers in the CIA. The CIA funding was kept secret in order that readers wouldn’t know that attempts were being made to manipulate their views from across the pond.

Neither of the government funded organisations operated in a transparent manner. Quite the opposite in fact. Mr Godson, who worked for the Reagan administration, will almost certainly be aware of the covert nature of these organisations. In true neo-conservative style, this does not seem to bother him in the slightest.

This suggests rather strongly that Mr Godson is a believer in the idea of the political noble lie as a means to achieve social cohesion and national security.

And he is the “Research Director” of Policy Exchange, an organisation which purports to be “an independent think tank… committed to an evidence-based approach to policy development”.

Right…

I’m no expert but I’m not sure that Dean Godson is the best man for the job.

As you’ll probably know, the latest US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear programme came to an astonishing conclusion. The antagonistic relationship between Tehran and Washington could escalate the situation at any time (as could “events” on the Iran/Iraq border) but this new report dramatically lessens the likelihood of a major military confrontation between the two countries before the end of the Bush presidency. It’s a really rather refreshing bit of good news.

Bush, of course, continues to insist that “all options are on the table”. John Bolton, who may well be the commander-in-chief of all armchair generals everywhere, has taken to the airwaves to cast doubt on the conclusions of the NIE. He even went as far as to suggest (in the form of a question, of course) that the report was the result of politically motivated attack on the Bush administration:

I think there is a risk here, and I raise this as a question, whether people in the intelligence community who had their own agenda on Iran for some time now have politicized this intelligence and politicized these judgements in a way contrary to where the administration was going.

Because in Bolton’s world, if you don’t agree with him, you’re clearly a mendacious leftist and a terrorist loving traitor. I give it another 24 hours before he starts publicly agitating for a war against the US intelligence community.

In reality, the volte-face in the conclusion of the National Intelligence Estimate (pdf) appears to be based on an objective analysis of the available facts. It suggests that US intelligence agencies are attempting to rectify the failures which led to the invasion of Iraq.

The report was not the written based on the assumption that the Iranian regime does intend to acquire nuclear weapons. It was, rather, an attempt to “assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire nuclear weapons”.

More importantly perhaps, the conclusions of the report appear to be untainted by political pressures. Clearly, the NIE discredits claims made by many of Bush’s supporters and damages the “Iran is going to kill us all” narrative being pushed from the Whitehouse. The Bush administration will not have welcomed these conclusions but they’ve been published all the same. It is possible that lessons really have been learned from the Iraq debacle.

(Can we same the same in the UK, I wonder?)

The most interesting conclusion of the NIE is this:

Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program.

A cost-benefit approach? But that’d imply that the Iranian regime were behaving, gasp, perfectly rationally. Surely some mistake…

The IAEA has released it’s latest report into Iran’s nuclear activities (pdf).

It’s interesting. One of the myths which you’ll find on the interwebs is the suggestion that Iran has stopped cooperating with the IAEA and denied them access to all of their nuclear facilities.

Not so.

Here’s what the IAEA had to say about the access they have been given to Iran’s Fuel Enrichment Facility (FEP) in Natanz:

Since March 2007, a total of seven unannounced inspections have been carried out at FEP.

That’s a lot of unannounced inspections.

The IAEA also reports that:

Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan.

The Iranians are actually providing a substantial degree of cooperation to the IAEA.

Nevertheless, questions remain regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. The IAEA remain concerned about the heavy water reactor the Iranians are building at Arak. This reactor, once complete, could be used to produce weapons grade plutonium. The IAEA report says:

The Agency must rely on satellite imagery of this plant as
it does not have routine access to it while the Additional Protocol remains unimplemented.

The Additional Protocol was a voluntary arrangement which the Iranians agreed to abide by for 2 years or so and then withdrew from in 2005. As such, the Iranians are not currently obliged to provide routine access to this plant under the terms of the NPT.

Estimates vary but the Iranians say this reactor could be completed as early as 2009. As is the way with these projects, it’ll probably take longer than that but the Iranians appear determined to complete the project at the earliest opportunity.

Iran’s nuclear activities have clearly generated a huge amount of hype, misrepresentation, lies and scaremongering in certain quarters. Frightening claims are made which are simply not true. We should contest these fictions and fight any attempts by our government to build policies based on them.

But we shouldn’t forget that there undoubtedly is a factual basis for concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. This is potentially a very serious issue indeed.

Try as I might, I can’t resist highlighting this extraordinary CiF entry by the former director of communications and press secretary at the Foreign Office, John Williams. It’s a bizarre combination of revisionism, an admission of culpability and, well, idiocy.

There’s a bit of controversy over at CiF over the Guardian’s stealthy rewriting of the sub-heading; they changed “I don’t remember anyone questioning the intelligence” to “I don’t recall my colleagues questioning the intelligence”.  The second version is the more accurate representation of what he was trying to say but it doesn’t really help his cause.

He wrote:

It’s very frustrating, as a minor participant, to have learned afterwards that that the head of MI6 felt the intelligence was being made to fit around the policy. I took the intelligence seriously. Nobody ever cast doubt on it in my presence at the time. And those last three words are crucial - at the time. Hindsight is a luxury government doesn’t have.

Nobody? At the time? Hindsight?

The Westminster bubble is clearly a much better insulator than we’d previously thought.

The admission which Williams sweetens with a little light revisionism is that the government as a whole wilfully refused to listen to the many doubts which were being expressed at the time. More than that, those of us with semi-functioning memories can recall that Blair dismissed these doubts by implying that if only we knew what he knew, if only he could give us the full picture, we’d see how ridiculous these doubts were. And didn’t we just…

Williams worked for Robin Cook, for crying out loud. You know, the Foreign Secretary who who, on the eve of war, resigned saying that “Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term”. But John doesn’t recall his “colleague” saying that. Maybe Cook never told the Foreign Office’s director of communications why he was resigning as Foreign Secretary. Maybe Williams somehow managed to avoid every single instance of the widespread media coverage of the reasons for his boss’s resignation. Or maybe… No, I’ll stop now before this goes all sweary.

Hindsight? How about using those fleshy things you’ve got on the sides of your head instead?

And what lesson can we learn from this fictional version of events as the government attempts to deal with Iran?

The dossier was a mistake. I say that not with hindsight, but having argued unsuccessfully at the time that Britain should not take on the burden of proving that a country to which we had no access was in possession of illegal weapons. It should have been for Saddam Hussein to prove that he didn’t have them.

Now, it must remain Iran’s duty to show that it is not trying to master the technology necessary to produce a nuclear weapon, not President Bush’s to assert that it is.

I’m thinking of starting a campaign to pressure Mr Williams into acknowledging the existence of the Celestial Teapot. He has, after all, failed to prove that it does not exist.

The Sunday Telegraph asks a senior British Army officer in Iraq to describe victory in Basra.

We would go down there, dressed as Robocop, shooting at people if they shot at us, and innocent people were getting hurt,” he said. “We don’t speak Arabic to explain and our translators were too scared to work for us any more. What benefit were we bringing to these people?

Break out the bunting.

There are, of course, very good reasons why Iraqi translators are too scared to work with British forces. Whatever your views on the war, the campaign to save Iraqi ex-employees of HMG is surely worthy of support.

The Telegraph goes on to report that:

Rather than fight on, they [UK Forces] have struck a deal – or accommodation, as they describe it – with the Shia militias that dominate the city, promising to stay out in return for assurances that they will not be attacked. Since withdrawing, the British have not set foot in the city and even have to ask for permission if they want to skirt the edges to get to the Iranian border on the other side…

With no presence in the city, British forces are hard pushed to keep abreast of what is going on. They say they get their information from local newspapers and from the Iraqi army, although one battalion of that force is isolated inside the city and the other battalion is in training outside. The British have already encountered much the same problem in the neighbouring Maysan province to the north east, which they handed over in April.

And that explains why the government still thinks there’s a possibility that they can spin their way out of this bloody shambles. If an Iraqi ex-employee of HMG is shot in the back of the head and there are no British troops around to hear the gunshot, does it make a sound? The government thinks not.

The working soldiers of the British army are not responsible for this mess; they were asked to perform an essentially impossible task.

John Ware’s documentary “No Plan, No Peace” did raise the question as to why senior military figures didn’t make greater efforts to stop their men being sent into such a situation. It is clear that many were well aware of the US and British governments’ failure to address post-war planning and knew that it’d be by far the hardest aspect of the invasion.

You’d like to think that resignations would have been the order of the day but it didn’t happen. Asked to prioritise the value of their soldiers versus their career, I don’t remember a single senior military figure opting for the squadies. Now, about five years after it might have made a difference, general Sir Mike Jackson has courageously decided to speak out by writing a book. What class…

Ware’s documentary also included interviews with some of the academics who were belatedly brought in to advise Blair on Iraq in the run up to war. The picture which emerged was entirely consistent with similar interviews for a Peter Oborne documentary for Channel 4. The academics briefed Blair on the enormous complexity and numerous dangers which would exist in post-Saddam Iraq. Blair listened politely but was more interested in asking the academics whether they agreed that Saddam was evil.

At this point (January 2003 or there about), it seems that any critical faculties Blair might once have had had become overwhelmed by his own spin. The academics were not supportive of the war because they could see that the US and UK government’s were totally unprepared for what would come after. Blair apparently took this to mean that they were apologists for Saddam.  Instead of giving value to their accurate and informed advice, he demanded that they participate in a Will-You-Condemn-A-Thon. At such a level was policy made and expert advice dismissed.

One of the academics, Dr Tony Dodge I think, rightly pointed out that Blair’s attitude was criminally negligent. Today, the Iraqi people are paying the price for that negligence with their own blood.

Blair, however, has never been held to account for his disastrous inability and/or refusal to understand the consequences of what he was proposing. That simply is not acceptable in a supposedly democratic country.

As a footnote, the documentary also highlighted the reason why those MPs from other parties who voted for the war cannot be allowed to avoid accepting their own responsibility. I’m looking at you Dave.

On the day of the vote, evidence which made it obvious that the invasion was going to lead to disaster was available to me, an average International Relations graduate with a TV, a radio and an internet connection. Are we really being asked to believe that this evidence wasn’t available to members of Her Majesty’s official opposition?

Perhaps that’s what Kim Howells meant when he said “our shared values”.

Or roast beef, Yorkshire pudding and torture.

Or fairness and equality for all (men). (Well, some men anyway.)

Howells also said that “some commentators will focus on our differences and ask how we can talk of shared values”. Well, yes. How can you?

There are many people who believe that the stated priority given to promoting freedom and democracy in the Middle East is just so much hot air designed to obfuscate the real motivations behind British foreign policy.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the British government’s involvement and support for the BAE deal to sell 72 Typhoon fighter jets to the Saudi government. This billion pound arrangement to sell highly sophisticated military aircraft to a regime which is corrupt, non-democratic, staunchly authoritarian, a serial abuser of human rights and a regular practitioner of torture cannot be explained by reference to the rhetoric of the “war” on terror. It can only be explained through the prism of narrow national interest considerations coupled with an admission that the promotion of democracy is not the dominant foreign policy influence claimed by the rhetoric.

There are those who will quite happily agree with this assessment and argue that it is nevertheless right to support this deal precisely because governments should pursue their narrow national interest above all other considerations. I don’t have any complaint about that; disagreement yes, but no complaint. There is an entirely separate argument to be had as to the best way to promote the national interest. I’d argue that this deal is likely to be damaging to the national interest, particularly in the longer term,. I’d further argue that decisions taken in pursuit of the national interest are often based on a narrow short term views and are often harmful in the longer term (politicians generally don’t do long term very well).

I do have a complaint when the government insists that it is absolutely committed to promoting democracy and opposing oppressive regimes and refuses to accept that selling powerful military equipment to a regime like the House of Saud flatly contradicts that assertion. The result is that the entire premise of the foreign policy debate as framed by the government is built on a myth. This is not only starkly hypocritical but it also effectively negates the ability of the people to meaningful debate foreign policy with the government.

It is, ironically, entirely undemocratic.

Yesterday, Bush drew parallels between the Iraq and Vietnam wars. I presume that a few spoilt brats in the National Guard, those with influential fathers perhaps, have managed to avoid being sent to Iraq too so he does have a point.

Bush played up the consequences of US withdrawal from Vietnam but failed to mention the consequences of US participation.

Let’s just take one of those consequences. The US military dropped approximately 20 million gallons of Agent Orange and other “herbicides” over Vietnam during the course of the war. Here are some photos of the effects of Agent Orange on the Vietnamese population. More than 30 years after the war, parts of Vietnam are still highly contaminated and people are still suffering as a result.

The American government has set up a programme to help US veterans who’ve been affected by exposure to Agent Orange. Under the heading “Agent Orange and Birth Defects”, the government website highlights the fact that “The Veterans’ Benefits Act of 1997 granted benefits for children of Vietnam veterans who were suffering from spina bifida”. Despite that, the US government has resisted paying compensation to Vietnamese victims of Agent Orange.

In 2005, when Vietnamese victims tried to take the manufacturers of the chemical to court, the case was dismissed. The judge ruled that they had not proved that Agent Orange caused birth defects and illness. This despite the fact that in 1984, several chemical companies paid $180m (£93m) to settle a lawsuit with US war veterans, who said that their health had been affected by exposure to the substance.

Perhaps there’s some scientific reason why American veterans are more susceptible to the ill effects of Agent Orange than the Vietnamese people who had the stuff dropped on themselves, their animals, their farmland and their water. Any scientists out there want to tell me what it is?

There are some signs that the US government may be slowly moving on this, due, no doubt, to the softening of relationships between the two countries rather than any humanitarian concern for the victims. Give it another 10 or 20 years and some sort of reparation might be on the cards for those who’re still alive.

And perhaps, in another 30 years time, people will again draw parallels between Iraq and Vietnam.