Big Sticks and Small Carrots

As you’ll probably know, the latest US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear programme came to an astonishing conclusion. The antagonistic relationship between Tehran and Washington could escalate the situation at any time (as could “events” on the Iran/Iraq border) but this new report dramatically lessens the likelihood of a major military confrontation between the two countries before the end of the Bush presidency. It’s a really rather refreshing bit of good news.

Bush, of course, continues to insist that “all options are on the table”. John Bolton, who may well be the commander-in-chief of all armchair generals everywhere, has taken to the airwaves to cast doubt on the conclusions of the NIE. He even went as far as to suggest (in the form of a question, of course) that the report was the result of politically motivated attack on the Bush administration:

I think there is a risk here, and I raise this as a question, whether people in the intelligence community who had their own agenda on Iran for some time now have politicized this intelligence and politicized these judgements in a way contrary to where the administration was going.

Because in Bolton’s world, if you don’t agree with him, you’re clearly a mendacious leftist and a terrorist loving traitor. I give it another 24 hours before he starts publicly agitating for a war against the US intelligence community.

In reality, the volte-face in the conclusion of the National Intelligence Estimate (pdf) appears to be based on an objective analysis of the available facts. It suggests that US intelligence agencies are attempting to rectify the failures which led to the invasion of Iraq.

The report was not the written based on the assumption that the Iranian regime does intend to acquire nuclear weapons. It was, rather, an attempt to “assess Iran’s capability and intent (or lack thereof) to acquire nuclear weapons”.

More importantly perhaps, the conclusions of the report appear to be untainted by political pressures. Clearly, the NIE discredits claims made by many of Bush’s supporters and damages the “Iran is going to kill us all” narrative being pushed from the Whitehouse. The Bush administration will not have welcomed these conclusions but they’ve been published all the same. It is possible that lessons really have been learned from the Iraq debacle.

(Can we same the same in the UK, I wonder?)

The most interesting conclusion of the NIE is this:

Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program.

A cost-benefit approach? But that’d imply that the Iranian regime were behaving, gasp, perfectly rationally. Surely some mistake…

Try as I might, I can’t resist highlighting this extraordinary CiF entry by the former director of communications and press secretary at the Foreign Office, John Williams. It’s a bizarre combination of revisionism, an admission of culpability and, well, idiocy.

There’s a bit of controversy over at CiF over the Guardian’s stealthy rewriting of the sub-heading; they changed “I don’t remember anyone questioning the intelligence” to “I don’t recall my colleagues questioning the intelligence”.  The second version is the more accurate representation of what he was trying to say but it doesn’t really help his cause.

He wrote:

It’s very frustrating, as a minor participant, to have learned afterwards that that the head of MI6 felt the intelligence was being made to fit around the policy. I took the intelligence seriously. Nobody ever cast doubt on it in my presence at the time. And those last three words are crucial - at the time. Hindsight is a luxury government doesn’t have.

Nobody? At the time? Hindsight?

The Westminster bubble is clearly a much better insulator than we’d previously thought.

The admission which Williams sweetens with a little light revisionism is that the government as a whole wilfully refused to listen to the many doubts which were being expressed at the time. More than that, those of us with semi-functioning memories can recall that Blair dismissed these doubts by implying that if only we knew what he knew, if only he could give us the full picture, we’d see how ridiculous these doubts were. And didn’t we just…

Williams worked for Robin Cook, for crying out loud. You know, the Foreign Secretary who who, on the eve of war, resigned saying that “Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term”. But John doesn’t recall his “colleague” saying that. Maybe Cook never told the Foreign Office’s director of communications why he was resigning as Foreign Secretary. Maybe Williams somehow managed to avoid every single instance of the widespread media coverage of the reasons for his boss’s resignation. Or maybe… No, I’ll stop now before this goes all sweary.

Hindsight? How about using those fleshy things you’ve got on the sides of your head instead?

And what lesson can we learn from this fictional version of events as the government attempts to deal with Iran?

The dossier was a mistake. I say that not with hindsight, but having argued unsuccessfully at the time that Britain should not take on the burden of proving that a country to which we had no access was in possession of illegal weapons. It should have been for Saddam Hussein to prove that he didn’t have them.

Now, it must remain Iran’s duty to show that it is not trying to master the technology necessary to produce a nuclear weapon, not President Bush’s to assert that it is.

I’m thinking of starting a campaign to pressure Mr Williams into acknowledging the existence of the Celestial Teapot. He has, after all, failed to prove that it does not exist.

When the Prince of Darkness starts talking about “serious consequences” for Iran, it provokes a troubling sense of deja vu. When Little Tony Blair joins in with a textbook evocation of the Nazis, that feeling is only reinforced.

There are differences between Iran and Iraq however. We should not lose sight of the fact that the Iranians actually could develop geopolitically significant weapons of mass destruction in a matter of years if they so desire. The IAEA does have real concerns regarding the purposes of Iran’s nuclear programme and Larijani’s resignation and his replacement with an Ahmadniejad ally suggests that Iran’s Supreme Leader is inclined to favour the President’s hardline approach. The Iranians insist that their programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes and it may well be but questions undoubtedly remain.

In truth, it is perfectly possible that the Iranians want nuclear weapons or, more likely perhaps, the capacity to build nuclear weapons if the regime is threatened. Given what has happened to Iraq and given also the constant belligerent “axis of evil” rhetoric, it would hardly be surprising if the Iranian regime was seeking to acquire a means of defending itself. Indeed, it can be argued that this would be the most rational strategy it could adopt. There are not many government’s in the world who would not attempt to defend themselves and their countries from a perceived threat.

The Iranian nuclear programme pre-dates the invasion of Iraq of course but it isn’t a huge leap to suggest that it is that unprovoked attack on their neighbour along with an essentially explicit suggestion that they’d be next which has made them so unwilling to compromise on this issue.

If (and it is still if) they are attempting to acquire the means to build nuclear weapons, what could be done to stop them? The answer is not a lot, especially if you’re the government’s of the US and UK.

For a start, moral authority on this issue isn’t helped by the fact that these countries have no genuine intention of abiding by the disarmament pillar of the NPT. Indeed, the UK, by adopting the precautionary principle in renewing its Trident capability, has implicitly admitted that it has no intention of abiding by the disarmament pillar at any point in the foreseeable future. The UK government will still insist that the rest of the treaty is fully implemented by other countries but the bits they consider to be detrimental to the UK’s national interest will simply be ignored. Not the loftiest of positions then.

In practical terms, the options are extremely limited. A land invasion of Iran is a non-starter. Even if the chicken hawks could create the political climate which would allow it, there simply aren’t enough troops to do the job. The Iranian regime knows this and it may well be a further reason for their refusal to compromise. They’re holding the best hand and they know it.

With an invasion ruled out, the favoured strategy of the armchair generals appears to be some form of limited strategic bombing campaign targeting Iranian nuclear facilities. There are so many problems with this approach that it’s hard to know where to start. First of all, Iraq should have been a graphic and bloody illustration of the inexplicably overlooked fact that “the other side” also has a significant say in the scope, scale, tactics and outcome of any military action. The armchair generals still don’t seem to understand this most basic rule of warfare.

A “limited” campaign will be far from limited when the Iranians respond in the ways the US military is least able to deal with. Coalition forces in Iraq would be a prime target. The notion of a “limited” military effort is a dangerous fantasy, as facile as the infamous belief in “sweets and flowers”.

And what would be the result of this “limited” bombing campaign? It may be a setback for the Iranian nuclear programme if certainly facilities are destroyed but it certainly wouldn’t provide any guarantees or offer any sort of long term solution. It would, however, create a tremendous backlash of Iranian nationalism as well as renewed support for the regime. If the Iranian government is trying to acquire the ability to build nuclear weapons, they’re not going to stop because of this. In fact, it’d only increase their determination.

Attacks like these would also create a further wave of anti-Western sentiment among (some) Muslims and give further credibility to bin Laden’s “the West hates Islam” propaganda. The long term damage will almost certainly far outweigh any potential benefits. Unfortunately, this option still looks the one most likely to be implemented by the Bush administration.

If they manage to resist the bombing, that leave sanctions or covert attempts to foster regime change. Neither looks like having a high chance of success in the current climate. If the Iranians really want to develop a nuclear weapons capability, it’s hard to see what will stop them achieving it.

There are a lot of “ifs” in all of this. After Iraq, those who continue to strip away caveats and express a certainty they can’t possibly substantiate are probably lost causes. It is certainly possible, however, that one of the most significant consequences of the Iraq war could also be an irony of truly gargantuan proportions. A war built on the lie that there was an urgent need to disarm Saddam of non-existent WMDs along with the idiotic fantasy that it would stabilise the region could result in a nuclear capable Iran in an increasingly unstable Middle East.

In a way, the most worrying thing is that many of those who were influential in the original decision to invade Iraq are still in positions of power. It’s hard to imagine a group of people who are less qualified to deal with the Iranian situation.

Since John Bolton was ousted from his position as US ambassador to the UN, he appears have taken up permanent residence in the Newsnight studios. Last night, complaining that the IAEA under Elbaradei has refused to say exactly what the neo-cons want him to say on Iran, Bolton came out with this:

“All that Elbaradei has said, and he is an apologist for Iran, in effect, is that he doesn’t have evidence of the programme. I think the intelligence is there for all to see.”

Has a familiar ring to it, wouldn’t you say? Hands up all those who remember being called an apologist for Saddam back in the day.

Bolton was, of course, one of the cheerleaders for the war against Iraq. And he was in the lead in the Bush administration’s attempt to block Elbaradei’s reappointment as head of the IAEA in 2005. Being good at the job and displaying integrity in the face of enormous pressure is not acceptable when it exposes the extent to which political dogma overrides the facts in the Bush Whitehouse. Fortunately, Bolton lost. For the record, 34 of the 35 members of the IAEA board member countries supported Elbaradei’s reappointment. Only one was opposed.

In the now traditional ironic style, the war on Iraq which Bolton was so enthusiastic about has actually strengthened the position of the Iranian regime to unprecedented levels. Bolton should have himself shot for aiding the enemy.

And Iran, unlike Iraq, could theoretically acquire the ability to build nuclear weapons in the not too distant future. Whether they are attempting to, as Elbaradei rightly points out, remains open to doubt. Not for Bolton and chums, of course, but for rational people not blinded by ideology.

There are plenty of commentators who argue that after the monumental disaster of Iraq, the US would not possibly take military action against Iran. I disagree. It is important to realise that Bolton, and indeed the Bush regime generally, are absolutely unable to learn from their own mistakes because they are almost entirely impervious to the facts.

And if that doesn’t scare you, you’re a lot braver than me.

Here’s a wee follow up to yesterday’s post on weapons of mass destruction.

It looks increasingly likely that Tony will need Tory support to get the vote on Trident through the Commons. As such, I was particularly interested to see what Tory blogger Iain Dale had to say about the issue. All the boxes were ticked.

Always nice to see Labour MPs reverting to type and playing fast and loose with the defence of the nation, isn’t it? Predictably they are likely to be joined in the No lobby by the LibDems who can’t quite make up their minds as to whether Britain should even have its own nuclear deterrent.

Fast and loose indeed. That’ll be that radical, dangerously naive, irresponsible minority of crazies…

Then, Iain demonstrated perfectly the point I made yesterday about what renewal at this time really means.

They say that in this post cold war era it is not as relevant and therefore could be scrapped. The truth is that we don’t know who our enemies are likely to be in ten, twenty or thirty years time. It may indeed be ragtag terror groups like Al Qaeda, but it may also be nation states with nuclear capabilities. The precautionary principle ought at least to come into play here.

So, when would Iain agree to fulfil our commitment to work towards disarmament? I tried asking:

The truth is that we don’t know who our enemies are likely to be in ten, twenty or thirty years time…

I’m curious to know how this fits in with our commitment under the NNPT to “pursue negotiations in good faith on… a Treaty on general and complete disarmament” (Article VI).

If you base this decision on the precautionary principle, it seems unlikely that you could ever commit to complete disarmament. In that case, you would certainly be in breach of the disarmament pillar of the NNPT. How then could you expect to have the moral authority to insist that other countries abide by the non-proliferation pillar?

Is it Tory policy to withdraw from the NNPT or would they, like Tony, just ignore the international obligations they don’t fancy adopting?

And do you know what? Not one single person replied or even acknowledged that comment.

As you can imagine, my surprise at encountering this turn of events was entirely non-existent. It’s the radioactive elephant in the debating room.

A few principled souls, probably from the left of the Labour Party it has to be said, will undoubtedly raise the issue in the debate tomorrow. All they’ll get for their trouble is a barrage of ridicule and scorn.

Because the idea that we should abide by our international commitments rather than picking and choosing to suit ourselves is patently absurd…

This week, the House of Commons will vote on whether the UK will commit to spending billions of pounds of our money over many years on a new nuclear weapons delivery system.

The government’s argument is essentially that we need to maintain our own weapons of mass destruction to protect us against unknown unknowns. That’s is a genuine argument but, as you may be aware, I don’t believe that the debate we’re having, if it can even be described as a debate, has made any attempt to seriously consider the implications of such an approach.

Taking the decision to retain nuclear weapons as a protection against potential future threats is very different from maintaining a deterrent against a specific existing threat as was the case during the Cold War. To do this now, almost twenty years after the end of the Cold War, would be to make a very public admission that the UK does not believe that nuclear disarmament is a realistic goal.

Maybe that’s true. But if it is, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, with it’s very clear commitment to work towards complete disarmament - the carrot given to the non-nuclear weapons states by the nuclear weapons one’s - is a busted flush. Even now, before a decision on renewal, it is hard to argue that the UK is abiding by its obligation under Article VI of the treaty to “pursue negotiations in good faith on… a Treaty on general and complete disarmament”. To take the decision to renew now would be to confirm categorically that the UK has no intention of disarming for decades to come.

That, ultimately, is the message which renewal of the UK’s nuclear weapons systems at this time would send to the rest of the world. And that should be a major part of the debate. Instead, Des “I can’t believe he’s our Defence Secretary” Browne and the rest of the government have attempted to stifle that discussion at every opportunity.

In the name of protecting our freedoms, of course.

According to the BBC, many Labour MPs are opposed to taking this decision. I hope they’ve got their smear defences up and running because questions will almost certainly be asked of their mental health.One of the strangest things about the debate over the UK’s nuclear weapons is that those who argue that the UK should no longer have nuclear weapons are somehow considered to be a radical, dangerously naive, irresponsible minority.

Here for the record is the list of current non-nuclear weapons states:

# Afghanistan
# Albania
# Algeria
# American Samoa
# Andorra
# Angola
# Anguilla
# Antarctica
# Antigua and Barbuda
# Arctic Ocean
# Argentina
# Armenia
# Aruba
# Ashmore and Cartier Islands
# Atlantic Ocean
# Australia
# Austria
# Azerbaijan

# Bahamas, The
# Bahrain
# Baker Island
# Bangladesh
# Barbados
# Bassas da India
# Belarus
# Belgium
# Belize
# Benin
# Bermuda
# Bhutan
# Bolivia
# Bosnia and Herzegovina
# Botswana
# Bouvet Island
# Brazil
# British Indian Ocean Territory
# British Virgin Islands
# Brunei
# Bulgaria
# Burkina Faso
# Burma (Myanmar)
# Burundi

# Cambodia
# Cameroon
# Canada
# Cape Verde
# Cayman Islands
# Central African Republic
# Chad
# Chile
# Christmas Island
# Clipperton Island
# Cocos (Keeling) Islands
# Colombia
# Comoros
# Congo, Democratic Republic of the
# Congo, Republic of the
# Cook Islands
# Coral Sea Islands
# Costa Rica
# Cote d’Ivoire
# Croatia
# Cuba
# Cyprus
# Czechia (Czech Republic)

# Denmark
# Djibouti
# Dominica
# Dominican Republic

# East Timor
# Ecuador
# Egypt
# El Salvador
# Equatorial Guinea
# Eritrea
# Estonia
# Ethiopia
# Europa Island

# Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)
# Faroe Islands
# Fiji
# Finland
# French Guiana
# French Polynesia
# French Southern and Antarctic Lands

# Gabon
# Gambia, The
# Gaza Strip
# Georgia
# Germany
# Ghana
# Gibraltar
# Glorioso Islands
# Greece
# Greenland
# Grenada
# Guadeloupe
# Guam
# Guatemala
# Guernsey
# Guinea-Bissau
# Guinea
# Guyana

# Haiti
# Heard Island and McDonald Islands
# Holy See (Vatican City)
# Honduras
# Hong Kong
# Howland Island
# Hungary

# Iceland
# Indian Ocean
# Indonesia
# Iraq
# Ireland
# Italy

# Jamaica
# Jan Mayen
# Japan
# Jarvis Island
# Jersey
# Johnston Atoll
# Jordan
# Juan de Nova Island

# Kazakhstan
# Kenya
# Kingman Reef
# Kiribati
# Korea, South
# Kuwait
# Kyrgyzstan

# Laos
# Latvia
# Lebanon
# Lesotho
# Liberia
# Libya
# Liechtenstein
# Lithuania
# Luxembourg

# Macau
# Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of
# Madagascar
# Malawi
# Malaysia
# Maldives
# Mali
# Malta
# Man, Isle of
# Marshall Islands
# Martinique
# Mauritania
# Mauritius
# Mayotte
# Mexico
# Micronesia, Federated States of
# Midway Islands
# Moldova
# Monaco
# Mongolia
# Montserrat
# Morocco
# Mozambique
# Myanmar (Burma

# Namibia
# Nauru
# Navassa Island
# Nepal
# Netherlands Antilles
# Netherlands
# New Caledonia
# New Zealand
# Nicaragua
# Niger
# Nigeria
# Niue
# Norfolk Island
# Northern Mariana Islands
# Norway

# Oman

# Pacific Ocean
# Palau
# Palmyra Atoll
# Panama
# Papua New Guinea
# Paracel Islands
# Paraguay
# Peru
# Philippines
# Pitcairn Islands
# Poland
# Portugal
# Puerto Rico

# Qatar

# Reunion
# Romania
# Rwanda

# Saint Helena
# Saint Kitts and Nevis
# Saint Lucia
# Saint Pierre and Miquelon
# Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
# Samoa
# San Marino
# Sao Tome and Principe
# Saudi Arabia
# Senegal
# Seychelles
# Sierra Leone
# Singapore
# Slovakia
# Slovenia
# Solomon Islands
# Somalia
# South Africa
# South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
# Southern Ocean
# Spain
# Spratly Islands
# Sri Lanka
# Sudan
# Suriname
# Svalbard
# Swaziland
# Sweden
# Switzerland
# Syria

# Taiwan
# Tajikistan
# Tanzania
# Thailand
# Togo
# Tokelau
# Tonga
# Trinidad and Tobago
# Tromelin Island
# Tunisia
# Turkey
# Turkmenistan
# Turks and Caicos Islands
# Tuvalu

# Uganda
# Ukraine
# United Arab Emirates
# Uruguay
# Uzbekistan

# Vanuatu
# Venezuela
# Vietnam
# Virgin Islands

# Wake Island
# Wallis and Futuna
# West Bank
# Western Sahara

# Yemen
# Yugoslavia

# Zambia
# Zimbabwe

Here’s the list of what I’ll call potentials:

# Iran
# Korea, North

And here’s the list of nuclear weapons states:

# China
# France
# India
# Israel
# Pakistan
# Russia
# United Kingdom
# United States

So there you are. The radical, dangerously naive, irresponsible minority is maybe just a little bit bigger than those leading the debate in the UK would have us believe. And, at the risk of sounding overly dramatic, I firmly believe that the decisions we make today will have a significant impact on similar lists drawn up by our children in decades to come.

That’s the debate we should be having and the one the government seems desperate to avoid. Instead, we’ve got Browne and Blair trying to frighten us into submission with bogeymen who don’t even exist yet.

And there’s an irony here. Foreign policy blowback is now a well recognised phenomenon. It is not a stretch to suggest that the government’s actions today might actually create the conditions which could give rise to these future bogeymen. And, as recent experiences have already shown us, a self-fulfilling prophet will still claim that he was right.

You don’t need to be a prophet to know that that won’t be part of the debate.

As you may be aware, Professor Juan Cole disputes that President Ahmadinejad ever said that Israel should be wiped from the map. He argues that Ahmadinejad actually said that “the occupation regime over Jerusalem must be erased from the page of time”.

In a private email which was hijacked by Christopher Hitchens without permission and subsequently published on Prof. Cole’s blog, he wrote:

Ahmadinejad was not making a threat, he was quoting a saying of Khomeini and urging that pro-Palestinian activists in Iran not give up hope– that the occupation of Jerusalem was no more a continued inevitability than had been the hegemony of the Shah’s government.

Whatever this quotation from a decades-old speech of Khomeini may have meant, Ahmadinejad did not say that “Israel must be wiped off the map” with the implication that phrase has of Nazi-style extermination of a people. He said that the occupation regime over Jerusalem must be erased from the page of time.

There are those who argue that this is a triviality, that the two translations have essentially the same meaning but there are important differences. Prof. Cole has alluded to one of them in the above.

Firstly, the notion that Ahmadinejad wants to wipe Israel from the map can be used to evoke Hitler and the Holocaust. Yesterday, everyone’s favourite propagandist, Con Coughlin, provided a perfect example of how this is done:

Most Israelis believe their country will do the same again if the outside world fails to call a halt to Iran’s controversial uranium enrichment programme, which few in Israel doubt is ultimately aimed at giving the ayatollahs a nuclear weapons arsenal to fulfil Ahmadinejad’s pledge to erase the Jewish state from the map.

Having already suffered a near-apocalypse in the form of the Holocaust, the Jewish people have no intention of being the hapless victims of Ahmadinejad’s genocidal designs.

Textbook.

Secondly, the phrase “wipe Israel from the map” evokes a literal meaning which conjures up images of mushroom clouds over Tel Aviv.

For those attempting to portray the Iranians as desperate to acquire nuclear weapons so that they can physically destroy Israel, the initial translation of Ahmadinejad’s phrase was a gift. With bows on. No wonder they’ve been so reluctant to give it back.

But there are a number of problems with this whole line of reasoning. The most glaring is the fact that Israel is home to some of Islam’s most holy sites. The idea that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran would turn the Dome of the Rock into radioactive slag seems rather far-fetched. Also, the right of return of Palestinian refuges, one of the keys to the continuing antagonism towards Israel in the Middle East, isn’t going to be greatly aided by destroying the country. And, like pretty much any other government, the Iranians are strongly motivated by a desire to hold on to power. They know that an Iranian nuclear attack on Israel would mean the end of the Islamic Republic.

And what does Ahmadinejad himself say about the infamous quotation? TIME magazine asked him:

TIME: You have been quoted as saying Israel should be wiped off the map. Was that merely rhetoric, or do you mean it?

Ahmadinejad: People in the world are free to think the way they wish. We do not insist they should change their views. Our position toward the Palestinian question is clear: we say that a nation has been displaced from its own land. Palestinian people are killed in their own lands, by those who are not original inhabitants, and they have come from far areas of the world and have occupied those homes. Our suggestion is that the 5 million Palestinian refugees come back to their homes, and then the entire people on those lands hold a referendum and choose their own system of government. This is a democratic and popular way. Do you have any other suggestions?

There is no doubt that Ahmadinejad wants to see the end of the “occupying regime over Jerusalem”; he has said so repeatedly. There is, however, an enormous difference between that and the suggestion that he has said he wants to physically destroy the country of Israel along with all of the people living in it.

Iraqis are already suffering the disastrous consequences of one war justified by spin and misrepresentation. It would be the direst of follies to allow that to happen again with Iran.

Strawman Disclaimers in Full

• None of the above is meant to suggest an opinion as to whether Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Evidence is thin on the ground but there is a possibility that they are.
• None of the above is meant to suggest that it would be no bad thing if Iran developed nuclear weapons. It would be a bad thing.
• None of the above is meant to suggest that Ahmadinejad is a good President of Iran He’s not.
• None of the previous disclaimers are a sop to those on hawks on “the right”. They are my actual views

Tony Blair’s answer to the House of Commons was this:

The current Vanguard submarines have a service life of 25 years. The first boat should leave service in 2017. We can extend that for five years, so in 2022 that extension will be concluded, and in 2024 the second boat will also end its extended service life. By that time, we will have only two Vanguard submarines. That will be insufficient to guarantee continuous patrolling.

The best evidence we have is that it will take us 17 years to design, build and deploy a new submarine. Working back from 2024, therefore, that means that we have to take the decision in 2007.

So the Vanguard submarine has a maximum lifespan of 30 years.

Richard Garwin (whose title may be Mr, Dr or Professor depending on who you believe) gave evidence to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee yesterday. He said:

US Trident submarines operate two-thirds of the time at sea, the UK subs about one-quarter of the time. The lifetime of the US submarines has been extended to 45 years.

He said:

I would expect that the UK submarines, from the point of view of wear-out, would last 100 years.. I see no reason why they shouldn’t last 45 years.

He said the steam generators would wear out but that they could be replaced easily and relatively cheaply.

He said:

If Britain wants to preserve a strategic nuclear choice, then taking a decision now to replace the Trident submarines is a highly premature and wasteful approach. Unless some grave error has been made in the design of the Vanguard, it should last 100 years.

So there’s a problem and when it comes to matters of trust, Blair starts with an obvious disadvantage. Even if he didn’t though, I’d still be inclined to believe that it’s the nuclear physicist who’s right.

Why now?

It might be possible to spot the answer in this article which manages to be on exactly the same subject and on an entirely different subject at exactly the same time.

(A note for clarity - the U.S. navy doesn’t use the Vanguard. They have their own design, the Ohio class. Comparisons are similar for similar, not like for like.)